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HIGHLIGHTS 
• We examined the developmental curve of risk-taking under uncertainty from 7 to 30 years of age in a 
cross-sectional design. 
• The Balloon Analog Risk Task was used to measure risky decision making under uncertainty. 
• A flat developmental curve was found for both overall performance scores and negative 
feedback reactivity scores. 
• Adolescents did not take more risks than children and adults at any stage of the task. 
ABSTRACT 
Real-life risky behavior seems to peak in adolescence, increasing the chance of negative and even irreversible 
outcomes, such as road traffic accidents, in this period of life.  We are still lacking conclusive evidence, however, for 
an inverted U-shaped developmental trajectory for risk-taking. This raises the question whether adolescents are 
really more risk-prone or when facing a novel risky situation, they behave just as children and adults do. To answer 
this question, we used the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) to assess the risky decision making of 188 individuals 
ranging in age from 7 to 30. The BART provided useful data for characterizing multiple aspects of risk-taking under 
uncertainty. Participants in all age groups were able to adapt their learning processes to the probabilistic 
environment and improve their performance during the sequential risky choice. Surprisingly, we found that 
adolescents were not more inclined to take risks than children or young adults at any stage of the task. Likewise, 
neither negative feedback reactivity nor overall task performance distinguished adolescents from the younger and 
older age groups. Our findings prompt (1) methodological considerations about the validity of the BART and (2) 
theoretical debate on whether experience accumulation on its own may account for age-related changes in 
decision making both in the lab and the real world, since risk-taking in a novel and uncertain situation was invariant 
across developmental stages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Adolescence is often marked by risky behavior (eg. Eisner, 2002; Sweeten, Piquero, & Steinberg, 2013). While 
reports about everyday behaviors (such as accident and crime statistics) continuously demonstrate and prove the 
adolescent peak in risk-taking, data from representative samples in controlled laboratory conditions have started to 
accumulate only recently. Typically, the occurrence of risk-taking follows an inverted U-shape pattern across 
development, being relatively low in childhood, increasing and peaking in adolescence, and declining again 
thereafter (for overviews, see, e.g., Boyer, 2006; Reyna & Rivers, 2008; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2004). This 
developmental pattern is explained by the ‘dual systems model’ (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010), which 
posits that risk-taking is determined by the interaction of brain systems underlying reward seeking and self-
regulation across multiple developmental stages (Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2007) and cultures (Duell et 
al., 2016; Duell et al., 2018). Along these lines, higher risk-taking in adolescence is predicted by the ‘maturational 
imbalance’ (Casey, Jones, & Somerville, 2011) between heightened reward sensitivity and immature impulse 
control (e.g., Braams, van Duijvenvoorde, Peper, & Crone, 2015; McCormick, Qu, & Telzer, 2017; 
Peper, Braams, Blankenstein, Bos, & Crone, 2018). Although the motivation of this theory was based on 
developmental differences, empirical results are still contradictory (Gladwin, Figner, Crone, & Wiers, 2011; Defoe, 
Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015). Not all experiments succeed to confirm elevated risk-taking among adolescents 
(e.g., Crone, Bullens, Van der Plas, Kijkuit, & Zelazo, 2008; Paulsen, Platt, Huettel, & Brannon, 2011; Weller, Levin, & 
Denburg), or showing lower risk-taking behavior in the adolescent groups even in affect-charged tasks (Steinberg et 
al., 2008). The role of risk opportunity might explain why adolescents do not necessarily assume more risks 
(Steinberg, 2014). This consideration led to the elaboration of the neuroecological model of risk-taking (Defoe et 
al., 2015), which predicts more risk-taking among young adults, depending on the social context (e.g., social 
norms). Some studies showed that both the unconscious appraisal of risk (Shulman & Cauffman, 2014) and risk-
taking behavior (Duell et al., 2018) peak in the early 20s. Others have found that young adults do not necessarily 
assume more risks as their opportunities expand (e.g. Eisner, 2002; Willoughby, Good, Adachi, Hamza, & Tavernier, 
2014). Thus, adolescent risk-taking remains puzzling, and more data is needed to reveal those crucial aspects of 
risky situations that produce the real-world developmental pattern. Here we aimed to map ontogenetic changes of 
risk-taking in a wide developmental window and used a paradigm that is equally applicable in different age groups 
and allows for characterizing various aspects of behavior in uncertain risky situations. 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002) has been used for the empirical assessment of the 
developmental changes in risk-taking. The BART is an incentivized risk-taking task with immediate but probabilistic 
outcome feedback on rewards and losses. In the task, people are required to make repeated choices where risk 
levels may be escalated or eliminated as a result of one’s previous decisions. Thus, the BART provides a link to 
decision-making accounts of risky behaviors dealing with sequential probabilistic outcomes (e.g., gradually 
increasing alcohol intake or driving speed). Indeed, performance on the BART has been shown to be related to 
these kind of real-world risk-taking behaviors (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Lejuez, Aklin, 
Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003; for an opposite view see Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, & Hertwig, 2017). Among 
adolescents of 11 to 15 years of age, self-reported pubertal status predicted risk-taking on a modified version of 
the BART beyond relevant demographic characteristics (Collado-Rodriguez, MacPherson, Kurdziel, Rosenberg, & 
Lejuez, 2014). Also, risk-taking propensity increased across three annual assessment waves in a sample of early 
adolescents (MacPherson, Magidson, Reynolds, Kahler, & Lejuez, 2010). However, using a cross-sectional design, 
Humphrey and Dumontheil (2016) were not able to show significant differences in risk-taking behavior on the BART 
among 12, 15, and 17-year-olds. 
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As follows, it remains unclear whether there is a behaviorally measurable developmental change in risk-taking 
under uncertainty. Here, we contribute to clarification in this field with data from a sample that includes a 
continuous range of ages that spans preadolescence through young adulthood. Moreover, in this study, we 
characterize multiple aspects of risk-taking behavior. Aiming to exploit the rich information provided by BART data, 
we computed both conventional and more refined measures. The latter ones grasp the adaptivity of the 
participants, reflecting a change in behavior as a function of previous experience and collected information 
throughout the task. As such, the results of our study may provide a deeper understanding of the developmental 
course of risk-taking. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Two hundred twenty participants between the ages of 7 and 30 took part in the experiment. We excluded 
participants because of technical problems (three participants), lack of engagement (two participants), atypical 
amount or quality of sleep relative to their age group or medication use (nine participants), and showing atypical 
behavior according to Tukey’s (1977) criterion (more than 1.5 times the interquartile range) relative to their age 
groups along any of the risk-taking measures (twelve participants). One hundred and eighty-eight participants 
remained in the final sample. Participants were clustered into six age groups between 7-10 (pre-adolescents), 10-13 
(early adolescents), 13-16 (mid-adolescents), 16-18 (late adolescents), 18-23 (young adults), and 23-30 (adults) 
years of age. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the sample. Participants were recruited from 
local schools with no special curriculum, and universities. The average years of parental education was 14.65±.23 
years in the total sample (14.15±.52, 14.57±.71, 15.40±.63, 13.96±.42, 14.45±.71, 15.88±.44, for the six age groups 
respectively). None of the participants suffered from any developmental, psychiatric, or neurological disorders 
(based on the parental reports for children and adolescents and based on self-reports for young adults). All 
participants gave signed informed consent (parental consent was obtained for children), and they received no 
financial compensation for participation. All experimental procedures were approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of the university (approval number: 201410; title of the project: Implicit learning and risk-taking across 
development). 
Table 1. Descriptive data of demographic and cognitive measures in the whole sample and the six age groups separately. 
 
Whole 
sample 
Age groups 
 (n = 188) 
7-10 
(n = 29) 
10-13 
(n = 42) 
13-16 
(n = 29) 
16-18 
(n = 38) 
18-23 
(n = 27) 
23-30 
(n = 23) 
F 
(df) 
p 
Gender (male/female) 80/108 14/15 21/21 15/14 16/22 8/19 6/17 
  
Age, 
M (SD) 
15.55 
(5.14) 
8.91 
(0.72) 
11.20 
(0.87) 
14.56 
(0.83) 
16.91 
(0.54) 
20.75 
(1.17) 
24.65 
(1.21)   
Digit span, 
M (SD) 
5.55 
(1.13) 
4.72 
(0.52) 
5.17 
(0.86) 
5.74 
(1.12) 
5.68  
(1.16) 
6.22  
(1.18) 
6.04  
(1.22) 
8.44 
(5, 181) 
< .001 
Counting span, 
M (SD) 
3.44 
(.86) 
2.68 
(0.50) 
3.28 
(0.93) 
3.75 
(0.86) 
3.46  
(0.65) 
3.96  
(0.78) 
3.63 
(0.80) 
9.46 
(5, 180) 
< .001 
Corsi blocks span, 
M (SD) 
5.12 
(1.04) 
4.38 
(1.04) 
4.75 
(0.70) 
5.58  
(1.05) 
5.50  
(1.13) 
5.33  
(0.96) 
5.22 
(0.79) 
7.38 
(5, 180) 
< .001 
Phonemic fluencya, 
M (SD) 
14.33 
(5.64) 
8.37   
(2.73) 
11.82 
(3.12) 
13.75 
(4.41) 
15.04 
(4.34) 
18.19 
(4.61) 
20.58 
(6.36) 
27.54 
(5, 175) 
< .001 
a Number of correct words 
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STIMULI, DESIGN, AND PROCEDURE 
We used a modified version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Fein & Chang, 2008), a well-validated and 
widely-used behavioral measure of risk-taking, originally developed by Lejuez et al. (2002). The structure and 
appearance of the BART were similar as described in previous studies (Kardos et al., 2016; Kóbor et al., 2015; 
Takács et al., 2015). The task was implemented in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). This version of the 
task is more suitable for the current study because of (1) the higher appealing characteristics (incrementing 
potential reward) that makes the tool more sensitive to individual differences and (2) the shorter trial length that 
makes the task more applicable for all age groups. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram for the BART. The BART is an ecologically valid model for the assessment of risk-taking behavior. During this task, 
participants repeatedly decide whether to continue or discontinue inflating a virtual balloon that can grow larger or explode. A larger balloon 
has a higher probability of explosion but also a potential for greater reward. 
 
During this task, participants repeatedly decided whether to continue or discontinue inflating a virtual balloon that 
could grow larger or explode. After each successful pump, the scores in a virtual temporary bank (the accumulated 
score on a given balloon) increased, as well as the size of the balloon. Instead of further pumping the balloon, 
participants could have finished the actual balloon trial and collected the accumulated score, which was transferred 
to the virtual permanent bank. Two response keys on a keyboard were selected either to pump the balloon or to 
finish the trial. There were two possible outcomes as results of a pump: The size of the balloon together with the 
score inside increased (positive feedback) or the balloon burst (negative feedback). The balloon burst ended the 
actual trial, and the accumulated score on that balloon was lost, but this negative event did not decrease the score 
in the permanent bank. 
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Five information chunks persistently appeared on the screen during the task: (1) the accumulated score for a given 
balloon in the middle of the balloon, (2) the score in the permanent bank, (3) the score collected from the previous 
balloon, (4) the response key option for pumping the balloon, and (5) the other response option for collecting the 
accumulated score. After collecting the accumulated score that ended the balloon trial, a separate screen indicated 
the gained score. This screen or the other one presenting balloon burst was followed by the presentation of a new 
empty (small-sized) balloon indicating the beginning of the next trial (Figure 1). Participants had to inflate 30 
balloons in this version of the BART. 
Concerning the structure of the task, each successful pump increased the potential reward but also the probability 
to lose the accumulated score because of balloon burst. Although the regularity determining balloon bursts was 
unknown to participants, it followed three principles: (1) balloon bursts for the first and second pumps were 
disabled; (2) the maximum number of successful pumps for each balloon was 19; (3) the probability of a balloon 
burst was 1/18 for the third pump, 1/17 for the fourth pump, and so on for each further pump until the 20th, 
where the probability of a balloon burst was 1/1. Thus, the probability of a balloon burst is given by the formula: 
 
where P(ei) is the probability of the balloon explosion on the ith trial (balloon), and pi is the number of pumps on 
the ith trial (balloon). 
One point was added to the temporary bank for the first successful pump, two for the second (i.e., the 
accumulated score for a given balloon was 3), three for the third (i.e., the accumulated score was 6); thus, the 
formula for the accumulated trial earning at the point of cashing out is: 
 
where p
i
 is the number of pumps on the ith trial (balloon), and n is the pump index within a trial, (e.g., first, second 
etc., pump). 
According to the instructions, participants were asked to achieve as high score as possible by inflating empty virtual 
balloons on the screen. Participants did not receive any guaranteed reward. However, they were informed that the 
participant with the most total earnings in a subgroup of 10 (within the same age group) was rewarded. In order to 
induce comparable subjective incentive value among age groups, the reward’s identity was unknown to the 
participants during data acquisition. The reward was a small gift in all age groups and changed according to the age 
groups. 
Besides risk-taking measurement, standard neuropsychological tests were administered. The digit span task (Isaacs 
& Vargha-Khadem, 1989; Hungarian version: Racsmány, Lukács, Németh, & Pléh, 2005) was used to measure 
phonological short-term memory capacity. The counting span task (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Hungarian 
version: Fekete et al., 2010) is a complex working memory task, which requires not only information storage and 
rehearsal, but also simultaneous processing of additional information. The Corsi blocks task (Kessels, Van 
Zandvoort, Postma, Kappelle & De Haan, 2000) was used to measure visuospatial short-term memory. The 
phonemic fluency task (Spreen and Strauss, 1991; for Hungarian version, see Tanczos, Janacsek, & Nemeth, 2014a, 
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2014b) is widely used to measure the central executive component of the working memory model (Baddeley, 
1992). 
The tasks were administered in two sessions in two subsequent days. The BART was administered on the first day, 
and the neuropsychological tests were administered on the second day. On the second day, the order of the tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants. Standard instructions and conditions were applied across all age groups. 
Participants did not receive financial compensation. 
RISK-TAKING MEASURES 
The BART allowed us to quantify multiple aspects of risk-taking. We calculated four conventional BART measures: 
the mean number of pumps, the mean adjusted number of pumps (mean number of pumps on unexploded 
balloons; see Lejuez et al.,  2002), the number of balloon bursts (Schmitz et al., 2016) and the earnings 
(Koscielniak et al., 2016; Schmitz et al., 2016). In the analyses, we either used these measures averaged across all 
trials or in three bins (trials 1-10, trials 11-20, and trials 21-30), in order to be able to assess changes in risk-taking 
across the 30 trials (as in Lejuez et al., 2002). 
One potential drawback of the conventional measures might be that they do not take into account the actual 
experience of the participant, which – due to the probabilistic structure of the task – is highly variable even for 
participants with identical behavior. BART data provides information above and beyond the conventional 
measures, allowing for the assessment of further important aspects of risk-taking (Schmitz et al., 2016). Therefore, 
we computed the post-explosion reactivity (which in Schmitz et al., 2016 is referred to as Δ post-loss pumps), that is 
the mean number of pumps relative to the pumps at the previous balloon explosion (or the mean number of 
pumps in the case of more subsequent bursts), averaged across all explosions in the task, according to the 
following formula: 
 
where E is the set of trial indices, where the balloon exploded; e is an individual trial where the balloon exploded; 
Ce:e’ is a set of trials (balloons) in between two consequent explosions e and e’; c is an individual cash-out trial in 
Ce:e’; pe denotes the number of pumps on the eth explosion trial and pc denotes the number of pumps on the cth 
cash-out trial. 
We also computed the immediate post-explosion reactivity measure, where we only took into account the first 
post-explosion trials: 
 
where pe+1 is the number of pumps on the trial (balloon) right after the explosion. 
Humphreys & Lee (2011) used an index corresponding to the immediate post-explosion reactivity as a measure of 
sensitivity to negative punishment. Accordingly, the two measures described above represent the extent to which 
participants adjust their responses to the negative feedbacks. If the post-explosion reactivity/immediate post-
explosion reactivity score is 0, it shows that, on average, the participant inflated to the highest level where the 
balloon did not explode yet in the latest explosion trial. A negative value indicates less risk-taking, and a positive 
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value indicates more risk-taking than it would be perfectly adapted according to the information from the negative 
feedback. Note that in the case of these two measures, the bin-wise analysis was not possible, only the 
conventional measures, since the number of data points taken into account was restricted by the number of 
balloon bursts. 
RESULTS 
First, we assessed whether a continuous quadratic model accounted for the developmental change of BART 
measures. We found that none of the BART measures – namely, the mean number of pumps, the mean adjusted 
number of pumps, the number of balloon bursts, the earning, and reactivity measures – followed an inverted U-
shape across development (all ps > .094, see Table 2 and Figure 2). 
Table 2. Summary of the results from frequentist regression analysis performed on all BART measures, testing quadratic fits. Note that 
regression coefficients are not included in the table, since none of the models accounted for a significant amount of variance in risk-taking. 
 Quadratic fit 
Measure R2 F p 
Mean Number of Pumps .008 .731 .483 
Mean Adjusted Number of Pumps .002 .219 .804 
Number of Balloon Bursts .007 .650 .523 
Total Earnings .010 .926 .398 
Post-Explosion Reactivity .020 1.842 .161 
Immediate Post-Explosion Reactivity .026 2.399 .094 
 
Figure 2. Quadratic regression models fitted to developmental data on six BART measures. None of the models were significant. Note: Higher 
numbers indicate greater risk-taking. Grey bands represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Next, we assessed the developmental modulation of the pattern of risk-taking across the 30 trials. For this end, we 
conducted mixed design (repeated measures) ANCOVAs with BIN (trials 1-10, trials 11-20, and trials 21-30) as the 
within-subjects factor and AGE GROUP (7-10, 10-13, 13-16, 16-18, 18-23, 23-30) as the between-subjects factor, 
controlling for verbal, visuospatial, and complex working memory. In order to satisfy the assumptions of ANCOVA, 
we ensured the independence of age and the covariates by standardizing the raw covariate scores within every age 
group separately. The dependent variables were the mean number of pumps, the mean adjusted number of 
pumps, the number of balloon bursts, and the earnings, respectively. The Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction 
(Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was used when necessary. Risk-taking was gradually heightened across the trials as 
shown by the main effect of BIN (all ps < .001) on the mean number of pumps, the mean adjusted a number of 
pumps, and the earning. The number of balloon bursts, however, did not change across trials (p = .328). Most 
importantly, we found no significant BIN*AGE GROUP interaction (all ps > .683, see Table 3 and Figure 3). 
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Table 3. Summary of the results from both frequentist and Bayesian mixed design ANCOVAs performed on all BART measures in three bins of the BART and six age groups, controlling for cognitive measures. 
 BIN AGE GROUP BIN*AGE GROUP 
BIN+AGE GROUP + 
BIN*AGE GROUP 
 BIN+AGE GROUP + 
BIN*AGE GROUP / 
BIN+AGE GROUP 
Measures F p BF01 F p BF01 F p BF01 BF01 
Mean Number of 
Pumps 
15.677 < .001 < .001 .678 .641 13.944 .704 .706 .021 88.346 
Mean Adjusted 
Number of Pumps 
26.308 < .001 < .001 .677 .641 15.049 .716 .683 < .001 132.107 
Number of Balloon 
Bursts 
1.119 .328 18.432 .384 .859 46.641 .636 .782 67170.252 80.946 
Earnings 12.193 < .001 < .001 .726 .605 40.551 .659 .762 2.378 148.625 
Note. The BF01 is not computed for the BIN*AGE GROUP interaction on its own but for the model containing the main effects and the interaction, as well. The BF01s in the last column indicate how much more probable is 
that the model without the interaction accounts for the data than the model with the interaction included. 
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In order to be able to conclude whether our data supported the lack of developmental changes, we conducted 
Bayesian repeated measures ANCOVAs, as well. According to Lee and Wagenmakers (2013), values of the Bayes 
Factor (BF01) larger than 1 indicate anecdotal evidence, BF01 values larger than 3 indicate moderate evidence, and 
BF01 values larger than 10 indicate strong evidence for the lack of group differences. We found strong evidence for 
the lack of age effects on all BART measures (all BF01s > 13.944). The results of the Bayesian mixed design ANCOVAs 
confirmed the absence of the BIN*AGE GROUP interaction, regarding all BART measures. The models without the 
interaction effects could account for the data better than the models with the interaction effects (all BF01s for the 
models containing only the main effects are at least 80.946 times larger than the BF01s for the models containing 
both the main effects and interaction effects). Moreover, the simpler model containing only the main effect of BIN 
could account for the data better than the model containing the effects of both BIN and AGE, confirming the lack of 
age-related changes. Thus, the uptrend in risk-taking across trials was characteristic of the sample, irrespectively of 
developmental phase. 
 
Figure 3. Change in risk-taking across three bins in the BART by age groups (indicated by different colors), as reflected by four measures. The 
mean number of pumps, the mean adjusted number of pumps, and the earning are higher as the task proceeds, while the number of the 
balloon bursts remain unchanged. This behavioral pattern characterizes all six age groups, with no significant differences among them. Note. 
Higher numbers indicate greater risk-taking. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Risk-taking on the BART was not related to the verbal, visuospatial, and complex working memory scores included 
as covariates either (all ps > .145; Table 4). Furthermore, the BIN*covariate interactions were not significant with 
the exception of the BIN*Corsi blocks span interaction effect on the number of balloon bursts. This interaction, 
however, was not interpretable, since neither the BIN (p = .328), nor the Corsi blocks span (p = .238) had a 
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significant effect on the number of balloon bursts. Since the cognitive measures described above were not related 
to risk-taking, we could omit these factors and the results remained virtually unchanged. We failed to show effects 
of AGE GROUP (all ps > .288) in the simplified ANOVA models as well. Moreover, there were no significant BIN*AGE 
GROUP interactions in the models fitted to either BART measure (all ps > .673; Table 5). Therefore, no age-related 
differences in risk-taking were found, regardless of whether we controlled for cognitive measures or not. 
Finally, we tested age effects on the extent to which participants adapted their responses to the negative 
feedbacks. One-way ANCOVAs were conducted with AGE GROUP (7-10, 10-13, 13-16, 16-18, 18-23, 23-30) as 
between-subject factor and Post-Explosion Reactivity and Immediate Post-Explosion Reactivity as dependent 
variables, controlling for verbal, visuospatial, and complex working memory. There were no significant differences 
on the reactivity measures among the age groups (F(5, 167) = 1.305, p = .264; F(5,167) = 1.290, p = .270, 
respectively). Bayesian ANCOVAs supported these results as we found moderate evidence for the lack of age group 
differences (BF01 = 8.553; BF01 = 8.568, respectively). Hence, adolescents were not distinguishable from children 
and adults based on their overall performance and their reactivity to the negative feedbacks during risk-taking in 
the BART. 
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Table 4. Comparison of the results from the repeated measures ANOVAs with and without covariates, on all BART measures in three bins of the BART and six age groups. 
 Repeated measures ANCOVA 
(with covariates: Digit span, Counting span, Corsi blocks span, Phonemic fluency) 
Repeated measures ANOVA 
(no covariates) 
 BIN AGE GROUP BIN*AGE GROUP BIN AGE GROUP BIN*AGE GROUP 
Measures F p F p F p F p F p F p 
Mean Number of 
Pumps 
15.677 < .001 .678 .641 .704 .706 16.922 < .001 1.112 .356 .754 .673 
Mean Adjusted 
Number of Pumps 
26.308 < .001 .677 .641 .716 .683 28.326 < .001 1.046 .392 .714 .711 
Number of Balloon 
Bursts 
1.119 .328 .384 .859 .636 .782 1.263 .284 .557 .733 .693 .731 
Earnings 12.193 < .001 .726 .605 .659 .762 13.003 < .001 1.250 .288 .712 .713 
 
Table 5. The main effect of BIN and the covariates, and BIN*covariate interactions in the repeated measures ANOVA models fitted to all BART measures. 
 BIN Digit span Counting span Corsi blocks span Phonemic fluency BIN*Digit span 
BIN*Counting 
span 
BIN*Corsi blocks 
span 
BIN*Phonemic 
fluency 
Measures F p F p F p F p F p F p F p F p F p 
Mean Number of 
Pumps 
15.677 <.001 .478 .486 .608 .437 .040 .841 .234 .629 .009 .991 .096 .909 .998 .370 .091 .913 
Mean Adjusted 
Number of Pumps 
26.308 <.001 .237 .627 .675 .413 .220 .640 .056 .813 .529 .590 .048 .953 1.061 .347 .603 .548 
Number of Balloon 
Bursts 
1.119 .328 2.145 .145 <.001 .988 1.405 .238 .025 .875 2.069 .128 .755 .471 3.967 .020 .327 .722 
Earnings 12.193 <.001 .020 .886 1.053 .306 .971 .326 1.359 .245 .230 .795 .260 .771 1.852 .158 .407 .666 
Note. The only significant covariate effect, the BIN * Corsi blocks span interaction effect on the number of balloon bursts (marked in bold font) is not interpretable, since neither the BIN nor the Corsi blocks span had a 
significant main effect. 
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DISCUSSION 
Despite the common real-life accounts for elevated risk-taking in adolescence, findings on age differences have 
remained conflicting. Here we aimed to assess risk-taking using the same experimental context that allows for 
measuring multiple aspects of sequential risk-taking in a relatively long period of ontogeny, from 7 to 30 years of 
age. We were not able to show age-related changes in risk-taking measures. Moreover, the results of Bayesian 
analyses proved that the adevelopmental model of sequential risk-taking data is the most plausible. Overall, the 
lack of age-related changes was consistently found for the overall risk-taking as well as for the course of risk-taking 
across multiple decisions. 
Our firmly negative results may be surprising, as they neither fit into the theories of adolescent risk-taking nor fall 
into the line of empirical results showing an inverted U-shaped developmental course of risk-taking. For example, 
neurodevelopmental imbalance models suggest that there is a potential for an imbalance between cognitive and 
affective processes in adolescence (Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2007), and these models postulate, in 
particular, that in emotionally charged (‘hot’) situations, adolescents’ hypersensitive motivational-affective system 
often overrides cognitive control capacities that adolescents might have. Indeed, meta-regression analyses 
revealed that adolescents take more risks than adults on ‘hot’ tasks with immediate outcome feedback on rewards 
and losses (Defoe et al., 2015). Both MacPherson et al. (2010) and Collado, Felton, MacPherson, & Lejuez (2014) 
showed that risk-taking elevates across multiple waves of annual assessments in an adolescent sample. Likewise, 
Peper et al. (2018) found increasing risk-taking across three time-points separated by 2 years, leveling off in young 
adulthood. However, along with previous studies (Lejuez et al., 2002; Kardos et al., 2016), we showed that risk-
taking levels rise across a single session of BART as well. As predicted by the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), loss aversion leads to sub-optimal performance in the initial phase of the sequence of probabilistic decisions, 
and most participants approach the optima by accumulating experience. Therefore, it becomes hard to interpret 
the results of the longitudinal studies mentioned above, since the differences among the annual assessments might 
reflect both developmental changes and trial-by-trial changes captured within sessions. The flat developmental 
curve derived from our cross-sectional data prompts to consider the possibility that decision-making processes 
taking place in uncertain and affect-charged situations might not all be subject to ontogenetic changes. Thinking of 
human decision-making as Bayesian inference (e.g., Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008), it depends on estimated 
probability distributions based on previous observations, in other words, on the prior. Adolescents, having had less 
experience, have less information available for representing the probabilistic structure of decision situations via 
priors. Along these lines, we can speculate that differences not only in the decision-making processes per se, but 
also differences in the reliability of the priors that serve as input to those processes can account for the real-life 
observations about adolescent risk-taking. By the use of tasks that participants had not had previous experience 
with, and that are distinct from real-life risk-taking situations, the role of priors is supposedly reduced. In the novel 
decision context of the BART, age groups did not diverge in terms of risk-taking behavior. 
Another possible explanation of our results is of a methodological nature. The lack of developmental changes in our 
study may suggest that the original version of the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) is not entirely capable of modeling all 
crucial components of real-life risky situations. Nevertheless, the BART fits to both 
the naïve and economic definitions of risk in a sense that each successive pump increases the exposure to negative 
outcome and relates to increased variance in the possible outcomes (Helfinstein et al., 2014), and the exact 
probability of outcomes (balloon burst or balloon increase) is not known to participants at any moment. Thus, the 
BART could still be closer to many everyday risk-taking behaviors than other tasks that have been used for 
investigating the development of risk-taking. These include tasks where the probability of outcomes is either clearly 
stated to the participants (e.g., Van Duijvenvorde, Jansen, Bredman, and Huezinga (2012) using the informed 
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version of the Iowa Gambling Task; Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, and Crone (2008) and Van Leijenhorst, et al. 
(2010) using a modified version of the Cambridge Gamble Task), or relatively easily discoverable (Huizenga, Crone, 
& Jansen, 2007).  Future studies directly examining and testing how different tasks relate to different aspects of 
real-life risk-taking seem warranted.  
Different versions of the BART might lead to different results as well. In the most recent cross-sectional and cross-
national study on the development of risk-taking (Duell et al., 2018), the modified version of the BART was used. 
They found a curvilinear developmental pattern on the total sample of 5227 participants, the peak in risk-taking 
occurring in the early to mid-20s. Moreover, the quadratic pattern in risk-taking was significant in 8 out of 11 of the 
countries studied. In the BART version used by Duell et al., the balloon inflated continuously until the participant 
paused the inflation by pressing the space bar again. From this point, participants could incrementally inflate the 
balloon by pressing the space bar. When the desired inflation size was reached, participants hit a separate key to 
obtain the points accumulated. Thus, on each trial, the participants had to stop the automatic inflation first, and 
then actively inflate the balloon further. By contrast, in the version that was used both in our study and the original 
Lejuez et al. (2002) study, the balloons were only inflated as a consequence of the active risk-taking of the 
participants. That is, there was no automatic ‘startup’ inflation at the beginning of the task. The hybrid BART 
version used by Duell et al. might be sensitive to other aspects of risk-taking too since each trial involves not only 
active risk seeking but also active risk aversion in the first step of the trial (i.e., when participants have to stop the 
automatic inflation). In the present study, using the BART version in which individuals themselves had to assume 
risks in every step of a trial, as opposed to deciding from which point to start doing so, we did not find the same 
age-related differences as Duell et al. Notably, the study by Duell et al. was not only methodologically different, but 
also more extensive, using a sample of size 5227 as opposed to our sample of 188. Nevertheless, a power 
simulation confirmed that the probability of detecting the quadratic pattern reported by Duell et al. on a random 
sample of size of 188 is above 80% (see Supplementary material, Figure S3). This leaves us with the explanation 
that the aforementioned methodological factors contributed to the emergence of the developmental differences in 
risk-taking in the study by Duell et al. and not ours. Development might differentially influence risk aversion and 
active risk-taking. Certainly, this remains an open question and it should be addressed with an experiment in which 
risk aversion and active risk-taking is directly manipulated, by using both BART versions in different age groups. 
It is also conceivable that complex strategies and impulsivity influence behavior on the BART. To achieve a larger 
reward (higher score), participants had to postpone their responses and not to collect smaller but immediate 
rewards. As such, higher rates of temporal discounting might lead to lower scores. Impulsivity, on the other hand, 
has been shown to be related to more and faster balloon pumps on the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), although these 
results have not been demonstrated consistently (e.g., Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez, & Robinson, 2005). It is 
important to consider the possibility that impulsivity has an opposite effect too – an urge to cash out soon. If two 
behavioral consequences of impulsivity, delay aversion and less deliberative, fast risk-taking cancel each other out 
in the final decision that is measured in the task, then the relationship between risk-taking and impulsivity remains 
undiscoverable. It is a challenge for future studies to disentangle how impulsivity might contribute to both lower 
and higher risk-taking than the optimum, due to premature cash-outs and fast over-inflation of the balloons in the 
BART. Such studies should also use other tasks and questionnaires that specifically measure impulsivity, complex 
strategies, and risk-taking propensity, in order to clarify the individual and interactive effects of these factors. 
Despite choosing a BART version that is presumably applicable in developmental studies for its shortness and 
sensitivity, some design features may have introduced confounding factors. Particularly, the payout scheme (a 
reward was granted only for the participant with the most total earnings in a subgroup of 10) may have induced 
complex strategies (e.g., reasoning about other’s probable performance). Whilst in theory, this special payout 
scheme makes the interpretation of the number of pumps more difficult, based on our and previous studies (e.g., 
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Hunt et al. 2005) we believe that it does not affect the results. On the other hand, the characteristics of the 
feedback are presumably crucial, since the BART can be viewed as a trial-and-error learning task. Findings 
suggesting that children’s learning benefits more from positive than negative feedback (Lange-Küttner, Averbeck, 
Hirsch, Wießner, & Lamba, 2012) should be taken into account when interpreting our and other results on the 
development of risk-taking on the BART. Further studies should clarify the role of the mere acknowledgment of 
other’s role in one’s own decision, and the differential effects of positive versus negative feedback in risk-taking 
across the development. 
Peer presence per se is proved to have an effect on the decision-making of adolescents, leading to riskier choices 
(e.g., Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011; Smith, Chein, & Steinberg, 2014), or even more cautious 
behavior, probably depending on the situational context, the reward scheme, and the stochasticity of the task 
(Kessler, Hewig, Weichold, Silbereisen, & Miltner, 2017). Aiming to promote the disentanglement of the different 
factors of risk-taking, here we ruled out the social aspects, allowing for the examination of the cognitive process. 
Thus, we contribute to the literature with data on how teenagers decide what risks are worth taking when they are 
not directly influenced by friends or other peers (without implying that the results are decidedly explained by the 
absence of peer presence). We suggest further refinement of the theories of adolescent risk-taking in order to be 
able to pinpoint the crucial dispositional and social factors that are developmentally determined.  
Taken together, the current findings extend the vast literature on adolescent risk-taking by providing substantial 
evidence for no developmental changes from 7 to 30 years of age. While most studies in this field employ one or 
two measures, here we conducted a more thorough assessment of risk-taking by looking separately at the behavior 
(1) on trials with no negative feedback, (2) the change in behavior after a negative feedback, and (3) overall task 
performance, in the BART. Despite these and other methodological strengths, our study is not conclusive, thus 
warranting more extensive data analysis and refinement of theoretical frameworks in this field. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
We conducted a power simulation to determine the probability of detecting the quadratic pattern described by 
Duell et al. (2018) using a sample of size 188. Since the quadratic model has more than one parameter, the 
analytical solution for power analysis is problematic. Instead, we implemented a computational simulation (Jupyter 
Notebook available: https://github.com/noemielteto/BART_DEV_power_simulation/). First, we have generated 
5227 data points to emulate the empirical total sample collected by Duell et al., based on the parameters of the 
quadratic function fitted to their sample, reported in Table 4 of their paper. Thus, the formula for generating a 
BART score was: 
3.068 * gender + 0.987 * age - 0.037 * age^2 + error 
We sampled age uniformly in the range between 0 and 20. This corresponds to the age range between 10 and 30, 
after centering to 0 (the centering was used in the Duell et al. paper, so we conformed to this in our simulation). 
The gender term was randomly set to 0 (female) or 1 (male). The error term was adjusted until the standard error 
of the mean of the unstandardized beta approached the standard error values of the parameters as reported by 
Duell et al. in Table 4. The resulting sample of 5227 data points reflects the marked quadratic pattern (Figure S1) 
that was presented in the paper. 
 
Figure S1. The simulated sample of N = 5227 based on the regression parameters reported by Duell et al. (2018). Note that the X-axis represents 
the centered age values (ranging from 0 to 20, corresponding to the raw data ranging from 10 to 30). 
 
Next, we took 10000 random subsamples of N=188 from the total sample of 5227, and we tested the quadratic fit 
(F-test) of these random subsamples. In Figure S2 we show the first ten samples and the p-value of the F-test for 
the quadratic fit. 
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Figure S2. The first ten random subsamples of N=188 taken from the total sample of N=5227 that represents the developmental effect 
presented by Duell et al. (2018). The quadratic fit can be detected on eight of the ten samples with an alpha value of 0.01. Naturally, different 
subsamples will be yielded by running the simulation script, but the ratio of significant quadratic fits is stable. 
 
The results of this procedure can be interpreted as an analytical solution for power analysis. In Figure S3 we show 
that the probability of detecting the quadratic pattern reported by Duell et al. on a random subsample of N=188 is 
above 80%.  
 
Figure S3. Histogram of p-values of quadratic fit on 10000 random subsamples (N=188) drawn from a simulated population (N=5227) based on 
the regression parameters reported by Duell et al. (2018). The blue columns represent the density of the p-values. The red line represents the 
cumulative histogram of the p-values. The vertical black line represents the p-value of 0.05. Note that the cumulative likelihood of p-values is 
above 0.8 at the intersection with the p=0.05 threshold. This implies that the probability of detecting a quadratic pattern with an alpha level of 
0.05 was higher than 80%. 
 
Given that most researchers use a threshold for statistical power of 80%, the sample size used in our study meets 
the consensual standard for adequacy. If the same developmental trajectory of risk-taking had been characteristic 
to our sample as to the large sample assessed by Duell et al., a sample size of 188 would have allowed us to detect 
the pattern with a high probability. Yet, the p-values for almost all of our statistical tests presented in the MS are so 
high that the probability of encountering them given an existing quadratic pattern was virtually 0 in our simulation. 
In other words, it is improbable that our results are false negatives, as supported by our power simulation. 
